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Abstract—Contact tracing is paramount to fighting the pan-
demic but it comes with legitimate privacy concerns. This paper
proposes a system enabling both, contact tracing and data
privacy.
We propose the use of the Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) trusted execution environment to build a privacy-
preserving contact tracing backend. While the concept of a
confidential computing backend proposed in this paper can be
combined with any existing contact tracing smartphone applica-
tion, we describe a full contact tracing system for demonstration
purposes.
A prototype of a privacy-preserving contact tracing system
based on SGX has been implemented by the authors in a
hackathon.
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a severe human and
economic tragedy. As of April 2020, more than 1.2 million
COVID-19 infections have been confirmed globally [1]. Gov-
ernments all over the world have taken action to prevent their
health systems from being overwhelmed. National lockdowns
as well as social and physical distancing measures have been
imposed to slow the spread of disease, [2]. However, these
measures have also brought large parts of the economy to a
standstill, elevating the risk of a sustained economic downturn,
[3].
A. The importance of contact tracing
Current research suggests that contact tracing could play
a critical role in avoiding or leaving lockdown, [4]. Contact
tracing can help maintain a relatively unrestricted society and
economy, while minimizing the damage to the health of the
population, [5]. Since most transmissions are estimated to
occur from pre-symptomatic individuals, traditional manual
contact tracing procedures are too slow to effectively contain
the COVID-19 spread, [6]. But smartphone apps that immedi-
ately alert recent close contacts and prompt them to self-isolate
may significantly increase the efficacy of contact tracing.
B. Privacy concerns
It is estimated that 60% of a country’s population would
need to participate in contact tracing for it to be effective,
but privacy concerns may slow adoption [7]. The fundamental
problem is the simple fact that to determine whether two peo-
ple were in contact their location data needs to be compared.
This directly conflicts with the desire of most people to keep
their location data private, leading to a trade-off between health
and privacy.
Contact tracing systems built by the Chinese and South
Korean governments have favored health over privacy in
the context of the current pandemic. These systems recently
came under public scrutiny over issues of data protection
and privacy. Critics argue that emergency measures tend to
be expanded beyond their original scope, [8]. Hence, liberal
countries are clearly in favor of opt-in based apps that use
privacy-preserving technologies to minimize privacy and civil
liberty intrusions, [9]. For example, a group of European ex-
perts recently launched the Pan-European Privacy Preserving
Proximity Tracing Initiative to guide on best practices for
developing contact tracing apps, but privacy concerns remain,
[10], [11].
C. From TPPs to TEEs
Conventional systems rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
to keep track of potential infection chains and orchestrate
notifications (see section II). This has led some to conclude
the need for elaborate governance structures. For example,
in [12] the authors suggest amending the Epidemics Act to
incorporate so called data trustees, who shall be entrusted
with guaranteeing proper data handling. Such considerations
are based on the assumption that contact tracing requires the
presence of a TTP. However, with the advent of confidential
computing this assumption seems outdated, as Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEEs) may make TTPs obsolete.
D. Confidential computing
Confidential computing refers to performing computations
with additional data confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
TEEs have recently emerged as one of the most flexible and
mature technologies, which can enable confidential computing.
Many of today’s leading technology companies are actively
developing and promoting confidential computing technolo-
gies. For example, companies like Microsoft, Google, Alibaba
Cloud and others have joined forces to form the Confidential
Computing Consortium under the Linux Foundation, [13].
Currently, Intel’s SGX is the most advanced TEE implementa-
tion and the main technology the members of the Confidential
Computing Consortium focus on, [14].
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This paper proposes an Intel SGX-based contact tracing
system which provably cannot reveal any user’s location data
while providing all benefits of a traditional contact tracing
system. We focus on a confidential computing backend that
can be used in combination with any of the currently existing
contact tracing apps, requiring only minimal modifications.
II. CURRENT CONTACT TRACING SYSTEMS
Current contact tracing apps typically rely on pushing
the infected user’s location data to the entire system. These
location data include GPS and/or proximity data, i.e. (typically
randomized) identifiers of devices that were close to the
current device. On every user’s phone, all infected users’ data
are then compared to the locally stored location data in order
to determine whether the mobile user has been within close
proximity to infected individuals.
If the data is GPS data, this immediately reveals the infected
user’s past movements and offers very little privacy. If the data
is proximity data, this may substantially leak privacy as well.
Privacy loss may occur (a) to the mobile-phone user, and/or
(b) to the diagnosed patient.1 Attackers will prefer to attack
large data sets located at Hospital servers.
These privacy problems can negatively influence a user’s
decision and willingness to disclose their infection to the
system. They may therefore substantially degrade the system’s
overall effectiveness.
Two examples of existing contact tracing systems are dis-
cussed in the following.
A. Example 1: HaMagen
Israel’s health ministry recently launched the contact tracing
system HaMagen, [15], [16], [17]. HaMagen claims that it only
processes the users’ location data on their devices. However,
the system relies on pushing the location data of all infected
users over government servers to all users in the system.
Hence, the location data of infected people is not protected
at all.
B. Example 2: TraceTogether
TraceTogether’s approach is similar to the idea behind
Apple’s “find my device” technology, [18]. Every active
phone continuously monitors for Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
beacon messages, which are broadcasted from other devices
together with some identifier. When it picks up one of these
signals, the participating phone tags the data and stores it.
As a result, no location data is stored on device, but rather a
list of “identifiers” of the users one has met. In order to make
location tracking more difficult, regularly changing random
identifiers, derived from a user’s secret key, are used. However,
in order to identify potential transmissions, an infected user
has to reveal his or her entire proximity data to a central
authority, increasing the risk of re-identification (see section
II).
1For example, an attacker may re-identify an individual by matching
reported identifiers with his or her individual contact log. Second, an attacker
may reconstruct a user’s location history by matching any officially revealed
identifiers with maliciously collected ones, e.g. through Bluetooth sniffing.
III. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
Current contact tracing apps need to address the following
problems:
• Revealing data of infected users. Contact tracing apps
like HaMagen perform on-device transmission detection.
While this protects non-infected user data, it exposes
infected individuals to re-identification risk by pushing
their identifiers to all edge devices for local matching.
• Trustworthiness of central data processing. Other sys-
tems, like TraceTogether or Pepp-PT [11], require all
edge devices to send their collected location or proximity
data to a central server, where matching of infected
and non-infected identifiers is performed. Typically, this
makes it difficult for users to verify how their data is
processed by the server. More specifically, it becomes
impossible to guarantee that their contributed data will
not be used beyond the pre-agreed purpose of contact
tracing and will be deleted afterwards.
IV. PROPOSED CONFIDENTIAL CONTACT TRACING
SYSTEM
Contact tracing systems consist of two components: the
smartphone contact tracing app, installed on the user’s device,
and a contact tracing backend. While special-purpose TEEs
exist on smartphones, they currently do not offer all the
guarantees that are needed to conduct confidential computing.
Especially the concept of remote attestation is lacking in
most existing smartphone implementations, which makes them
impractical for the use-case discussed in this work.
Hence we propose to build a confidential contact tracing
backend to address the problems mentioned in section III.
While this backend in general can be used with any contact
tracing app, we propose a full contact tracing system (i.e.
including a specific app) for demonstration purposes.
The proposed backend shall leverage Intel SGX to confi-
dentially determine potential chains of transmission, without
ever exposing any user data to anyone—not even to the
platform operator. Much of the following description will not
be particular to a confidential computing solution. The key
benefits of using Intel SGX are twofold: one can prove that
the system works as described, thereby preventing data misuse,
and one can achieve a higher level of privacy protection than
with conventional systems.
A. A Note on Software Guard Extensions
Using SGX technology, the GPS data from the infected
patients are encrypted by the hospital in such a way that it
can only be decrypted inside the SGX TEE. Similarly, GPS
data from the user’s mobile phone is encrypted for the same
target SGX environment. Once both data sets are now within
the trusted boundary of the SGX TEE, they can be decrypted
safely and be compared. If a positive match is found, the SGX
TEE will report the result over a secure channel to (a) the
mobile user, and (b) optionally also to the hospital.
The benefit of the SGX TEE is that GPS data is never acces-
sible in plaintext. Once the SGX TEE finishes the comparison
of GPS data-sets, SGX will delete (“flush”) the data from
its memory. This ensures that the original GPS data-sets are
present inside the SGX TEE only for a very short time. This
has the advantage that attackers are unable to obtain access
to large GPS sets. We therefore recommend that hospitals
who are in possession of GPS data-sets of infected patients
to encrypt their data while in storage.
B. High-Level System Description
Assume each device generates and emits a random identifier
in discrete time intervals ∆t. For example, device A emits a1
during [t0+∆t) and a2 during [t0+2∆t) and so forth. Devices
in proximity2 to one another pick up these random identifiers
reciprocally and locally store the sent and received identifiers
in a contact tuple log. For example, assume that, while in
proximity to one another, device A sends a1 and device B
sends b1. In this case, A locally stores (a1, b1) and B stores
(b1, a1) (see figure 1).
Let’s now assume user C is tested at a health authority
H . If the test is positive, the health authority submits this
information to the confidential computing backend.
The (authenticated) user C polls the backend to see whether
or not the test was positive. Note that C cannot produce
false infection notifications, since only the health authority
can perform these calls to the backend.
If C decides to notify the user network of his infection, he
or she sends his contact tuple log, e.g. {(c1, a1), (c2, b2), ...},
to the backend which stores it in an encrypted database that
is provably3 only accessible to the backend4.
All devices regularly poll the backend for matches in the
encrypted storage by sending their contact tuples. For example,
when A polls the storage, he or she sends {..., (a1, c1), ...}. As
there was a match between, A’s and C’s tuples, A is informed
that he has been in contact with an infected individual. Note
that provably neither A’s tuples nor the fact that A was in
contact with an infected individual get stored or submitted
elsewhere by the backend (consider again footnote 3).
V. DISCUSSION
Much of the system proposed above is similar to existing
contact tracing systems. The main difference consists of the
fact that using Intel SGX, it can be proved using remote
attestation as well as memory encryption and memory isolation
(see also [19] for a high-level introduction to these concepts)
that the backend operates exactly as advertised. It is important
to stress again that the concept of a confidential computing
backend can be used in combination with any contact tracing
application, not just the one described here for demonstration
purposes.
A prototype of a privacy-preserving contact tracing system
based on SGX has been implemented and open-sourced in the
context CodeVsCovid19 hackathon, [20].
2“Proximity” can potentially be determined through additional technology.
3Note that giving this proof is only possible using confidential computing.
4Alternatively, infected people could upload a secret which allows deriving
their identifiers for any given point in time.
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Fig. 1. Example of random identifier communication flows.
The main benefits of the confidential computing-based back-
end are twofold: On the one hand it enables effective data
minimization (i.e., data does not need to be exposed to perform
contact tracing logic);5 and, on the other hand, it provides
transparent and verifiable data processing. This means that
users can be guaranteed that their data is only used for the
pre-agreed specific purpose of contact tracing. The specific
data processing logic can be open-sourced, audited and verified
through independent parties.
Note that the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of any
system—including confidential computing systems—depend
on a correct implementation. We did not describe such a full
implementation. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate
the concept and feasibility of a privacy-preserving contact
tracing system.
We believe that a privacy-preserving backend can enable
a more widespread and therefore effective contact tracing
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
We described the need for a privacy-preserving contact trac-
ing solution: Without a strong focus on data privacy, contact
tracing is unlikely to be widely adopted in liberal countries. We
propose the use of Intel SGX to build a confidential computing
backend that provably cannot reveal any user data and outline
a complete contact tracing system for demonstration purposes.
Together with currently available contact tracing smartphone
applications, such a privacy-preserving contact tracing system
could help mitigate some of the adverse effects of the current
pandemic.
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